Discussion: Staking v2

I like the idea of a chickenexit as well. It could work just like a toll bridge indeed where if you want out it’s going to cost you. Burning would be my favorite method of dealing with the ChickenFee. Great idea!!

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Yes. A much more eloquent explanation of what I was trying to get across. Big time yes vote for this.


First off, I just would like to start by saying that I appreciate the open platform for discussion on this crucial topic, I believe it to be key to contributing to the health of both the DAO, its members, contributors, and as well, towards continued incentivization and participation of larger and smaller stakeholders alike.

Please find my responses below to the aforementioned questions :

  • Would you like to see a single-sided MC staking pool next to the LP pool?

    Yes. I think it’s smart to give folks the option to choose. People have different reasons & circumstances for participating via their holdings & liquidity.

    By limiting staking to only LP, you may also force potentially large holders to liquidate ~50% of all holdings in order to partake in any staking (which imo would not end well).

  • What asset would you prefer as an LP pairing asset next to MC; ETH, WBTC, USDC or something else?

    I’m fine with ETH as-is, but know some have expressed concerns with potential for risk with this pair. The addition of USDC would be fine, options are good to have; Keep in mind, if you make the switch to only MC-USDC (for LP pair), some current MC-ETH providers may have to force-liquidate their ETH to make the switch to continue supporting liquidity.

  • What weights should the LP pool have?

    25% Single / 75% Double

  • What is the preferred platform for LP tokens? (currently uniswap v2 50/50 LP tokens)

    Uniswap v2

  • How long would you want the locking periods to be?

    I think the option for up to a 1yr lock period was brilliant, as it appropriately rewarded long-term think, while at the same time encouraged active participation / shared interest in the health of the dao among community members, & yet still recognized (albeit to a lesser degree) more agile, risk averse short-term think. We could do better encouraging active participation from VC, but this may be a universal problem than in just MC -world.

    Continuing on, I believe extending this further to offer the additional options could be prudent :
    2yr - more long-term think, greater rewards / better weighing (vs 1yr lock)
    Infinite - highest level of long-term think / commitment, greater greater rewards (vs 1yr lock);
    locked coins are never un-locked, as they are sent to 0x000000 (burnt)

  • Should the staking subsidy be fixed or partly variable?

    Fixed at a minimum.

  • What % of DAO revenue should go to staking rewards? (currently everything used to build treasury, re-invest and buy back and burn $MC)

    As with MIP-7 :
    20% goes to treasury
    5% to purchase BTC / ETH
    60% to create price support
    15% to buy-back & burn mc

    modifying this to :
    15-17.5% goes to treasury (-2.5 - 5%)
    5% to purchase BTC / ETH
    50-55% to create price support (-5 - 10%)
    15% to buy-back & burn mc

    could in-effect raise an additional ~10 - 15% or so to incentivize stakers;
    This could also be modified as required (e.g if revenue proves to inadequately incentivize continued liquidity participation, -or- in case that stakers may be over-recognized vs. continued strategic investment/price fuel). Keep in mind this is just an idea, requires debate / proposal, and could be way off base / not optimal.

  • Should the DAO, outside of locked MC, also distribute ETH, WTBC or USDC from revenue to stakers with longer locks?

    Yes, maybe. However, due consideration must be made prior. More complexity => more game theory => more risk for unintended consequences.

  • How long should staking rewards be locked for?

    1yr. to continue cutting short-term think.

A further note on seed :
Would like to see more participation from individuals that had participated in the seed round, however, I do also recognize that some backers support in ways unseen, and that governance processes can also seem foreign, unfamiliar or intimidating. Maybe we could think of other ways to improve the discussion flow among these cohorts, but im at a loss.

A further note on the cobie / staking article, shared by @huoguoshen :
I believe this article did have valid points, and they are due considered. In context of the mc / staking / dao mechanism, which should lean heavily on matching actual, real, long-term sustainable revenue flow (vs. dilution pulled out of the sky, as seen in many ecosystems unfortunately), I hope that it may not be as difficult for us to overcome the inflation challenges many of those models ultimately face, but I do thank you for bringing it up to attention.

Thank you,


I don’t think many added value at all, especially with their 0.032 cost. Zero risk.

I disagree with an added bonus APY. We don’t need MORE inflation, and using the ‘community budget’ is one of the reasons why we have such an immense lack of circulating supply. That should all be burned completely. We have way too many tokens in our uncirculating supply, and let’s not forget the team has another 20%, F&F has another 4%, and so on…



I like to bring up some ideas that haven’t been talked about in this thread yet.

- What weights should the LP pool have?
80/20 LP/Single Stake
As the LP pair is having a higher risk + providing crucial liquidity for all of us, a further gimmick could be increased voting power to the DAO. I can imagine a multiplier somewhere between 1.3-2.

- How long would you want the locking periods to be?
Minimum lock duration for single stake. I would propose here a 3-month min lock duration and no flexible staking at all.

-Should the staking subsidy be fixed or partly variable?
Fixed part as committing funds for lockup period.

Extra rewards could come out of the penalties from the proposed chicken-exit. Adding some gamification to a GameFi DAO seems fun to me. xxx% APY + 13.37% chicken-bonus. [For LP this means the non-MC part of liquidity will be used to buyback MC at market and add to the reward pool]

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Define ‘ value ‘ though ? It is an arbitrary metric, tough to pin down. Is name recognition ‘ value ‘ ? How about a spot on a cap table, or a handshake and a wink?

Does MC raise $100m+ at fair launch without VC ‘ backing ‘ ? Is governance participation alone greater than this? How about other metrics of ‘ value ‘ that got MC to where it is?

Further, do these entities also know that participation in governance is a pre-requisite (required) towards providing value, for example?

You’re probably itching to reply to this right now, saying something along the lines of : “ Well they damn sure should! “ But maybe not?

Maybe we could also do a better job of communicating this need upfront, it could be to this point, that it may not have been as obvious to the entities; just giving benefit of doubt.

I do mostly agree with you, just playing devils advocate.

Yea, they did, and can.

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@DAOCoreContributors, thanks for this thread. Thanks also to the community for good discussions so far, with a lot of great points made. Below are my thoughts on the questions.

Would you like to see a single-sided MC staking pool next to the LP pool?

Yes – both.

What asset would you prefer as an LP pairing asset next to MC; ETH, WBTC, USDC or something else?

I would not be opposed to any of the mentioned as things currently look. Stablecoins are on their way to becoming heavily regulated (e.g. through MiCA for the EU/EEA), but USDC should be in a good (likely the best) position to meet the requirements – so not worrying about that.

Appreciate the point several have made re. not pairing two risk assets, but rather USDC with MC. That is fine for me in principle, but I’m mindful that we currently have an MC/ETH LP pool and that (a) several investors have locked up their tokens for a period past the initial 12 month staking period and (b) the people staking in the ETH/LP pool would need to realise their current liquidity pool investments (with possible consequences relating to tax and impermanent loss as it may be at the relevant time). I’m therefore interested to hear how these points will be handled. I assume (a) can be handled through migration or similar, but not sure about how to handle (b) in a satisfactory manner. There might be some obvious answers that I’m missing here.

Further to this, I am curious about how the staking (and staking weight) will be handled when we approach the end of staking V1; will the staked amount continue to be staked from V1 to V2 (rollover with the same staking weight or with a reset staking weight) unless you unlock, or will it unlock automatically?

In the first week of November 22, a lot of investors that staked for 52 weeks (fully weighted) will have their unlocks. A lot of others will have their unlocks finding place in the weeks and months following that again. If those people do not unlock their staked tokens, but rather let the staking continue, the staking could potentially continue with a 52-week weight (or whatever other weight they chose). If the staking weight is not reset, those stakers would in practice be staking on a flexible staking scheme going forward, as they could unlock at any time due to that the initial 52-month (or other) period has ended. If that is the case, and the MC/ETH pool is replaced with a MC/USDC pool, then those stakers would likely be forced to “reset” their staking weight, and could end up being less favorised compared to the single sided stakers.

If the staking weight is not reset, the issue could be partially offset if the max lock amount is set higher than 52 weeks; then those with a 52-week weight would not be entitled to the highest rewards unless they unlock and lock for a longer period. If the staking is reset, then this issue does not apply, but see however the separate comment below relating to length of lock.

What weights should the LP pool have?

Maintaining 20/80 in favour LP is ok. Otherwise ok in the range 10-30/90-70 (in favour of LP).

What is the preferred platform for LP tokens? (currently uniswap v2 50/50 LP tokens)

Current platform is ok.

How long would you want the locking periods to be and should the staking subsidy be fixed or partly variable?

I think that the question relating to the length of the staking period is highly interlinked with the question relating to how the staking should be subsidised, as the staking cannot continue without subsidy (therefore covering both together here).

I believe that the staking subsidy should be fixed to provide stakers with predictability, meaning that we in practice would need to allocate some tokens from the community incentive pool. I’m also open for a variable addition, which could be structured through a distribution of native tokens or non-native tokens (see the comments to the two next questions for further details).

I’m for providing a longer lock-up period, but there must be a clear idea on how to sufficiently subsidy staking throughout the entire period. If we want the total amount of tokens distributed per day under staking V2 to replicate the amount distributed per day under staking V1, we will drain the community incentives pool within the next three year period (assuming all staking rewards stem from the community incentives pool). We can of course go for a lower amount to be distributed per day to prolong the staking period and thus have a fixed subsidy for say 48 months (with the trade-off that less tokens are distributed in total each day).

This also raises the question with respect to whether we want to allocate close to the entire community incentives pool for staking purposes. The tokens in the community incentives pool could alternatively partially be burned or they could be a tool for MC to raise more capital, e.g. through offering tokens against USDC to increase the treasury for the purpose of further development (games etc.), investments and other business.

Furthermore in terms of lock-up period; several people have locked-up their tokens for a period beyond November 2022 – say with 52 weeks starting today. If the lock-up period is extended to more than 52 weeks, would that person be entitled to lock for the new maximum amount or would that person need to wait until the unlock 52 weeks from today? This question partially ties in with the final points I made re. reset of weight and lock under the first question above.

What % of DAO revenue should go to staking rewards? (currently everything used to build treasury, re-invest and buy back and burn $MC)

As mentioned above, I think as a starting point the community incentive pool could be used for staking purposes (at least for the initial period), meaning that we do not necessarily need to utilise DAO revenue for this purpose (yet). We can of course introduce a variable element deriving from e.g. parts of the revenue (bought back MC tokens or direct distribution of non-native tokens, ref. below). I’m not sure if I would want to introduce a fixed percentage in this respect and would also like to provide the team with flexibility to utilise profits for further investments, development etc. We could of course utilise whole or parts of the MC bought back pursuant to MIP-7 (i.e. the 60% of the proceeds, not the 15% burned) for this purpose also, allocate some of the 60% for burn purposes etc. (many options).

Should the DAO, outside of locked MC, also distribute ETH, WTBC or USDC from revenue to stakers with longer locks?

I generally would not be opposed to see this idea be implemented in a format at some point, but not sure in combination with staking currently. It might perhaps work as a combination (i) fixed staking by utilising tokens from community incentive pool and (ii) parts of the DAO revenue for non-native token distribution.

I see some here are worried that we in such case would be giving away DAO assets. Whilst that is true, it could be structured so that the net effects for the DAO are the same as with buy backs and subsequent distributions of the bought back MC; the DAO distributes the funds/profits which the DAO otherwise would have used to buy back MC. Instead of using USDC, ETH etc. to buy back MC, the DAO would rather distribute it directly to stakers, resulting in a corresponding net effect for the DAO (equal amount of ETH, USDC etc. spent by the DAO in the exercise). The possible upside of implementing this type of rewards scheme is that holders of MC do not have to actually sell their MC to realise profits through their MC holdings. Rather, they could use the non-native token received to e.g. buy more MC (or use it as a pair in the LP pool), and thus potentially resulting in a decreased sell pressure, but increased buy pressure.

If such rewards scheme is implemented in the future, it must (in my opinion) be made variable – we cannot have a fixed distribution of BTC, ETH, USDC etc. from the treasury. Further, I think it should not be something distributed on a daily basis like the current staking program, but rather (at a maximum) on a few occasions throughout a year for long term holders/stakers only (it needs to be structured in a way that excludes mercenary holders from participating).

This kind of rewards scheme would obviously require a lot of thinking around structure (also from a regulatory point of view) and I would be happy continuing with a pure MC staking rewards scheme for now. I would nevertheless be interested to hear the Core Contributors’ thoughts on how to structure this (either now or in the future).

How long should staking rewards be locked for?

Happy with the current 12-month period from claim. If possible, it would be great if the single sided staking rewards and LP staking rewards could be claimed through one transaction instead of two separate ones as it is currently.


Lots of good input. I’ll start with two mechanism that were proposed and I’ve liked and then touch on personal view on platform and pairing asset.

Exponential rewards consideration is interesting. Instead of a linear bonus multiplier.

Early exit penalty is another thing we could consider. Like a cash-out with a bookmaker there should be a house (DAO) advantage. So the relative costs should exceed the time value that is unlocked.

I see most people favor USDC. Let me try and make the case for ETH. My argument for ETH (or WBTC) over USDC would be that with USDC you incur at least 2%, but more likely 5-10% inflation per year in the next years. Higher in a worst-case scenario. And that is on an understated CPI basis.

You would force everyone in the LP pool to take on this inflation. All fiat currencies trend to zero with almost 100% probability over a long timeframe. I think the probabilities and trajectory for WBTC and ETH are opposite. Obviously, all have risks.

Also, the correlation of WBTC and ETH to MC should on average be better, means less implied future IL. Lastly, people with staked MC LPs choose for crypto exposure. They chose for crypto risk with crypto upsides. They can have USD or non-crypto exposure in different buckets that are not affecting each other. And hedge this way, if they feel that need. In a USD-crypto LP setup you force LPs to mix risks of two assets with completely different risks. Totalling a higher risk-profile for the total position.

Of course both scenarios (IL and relative inflation loss) would be severely mitigated with a uneven pool in favor of MC.

An inflation protected, CPI adjusted, stablecoin might be best, but there are no good options for that yet.

Single pool
I do think we need to keep a single pool, but further adjust the split in favor of the LP pool. By having a single pool you ensure that the “laziest” people can still make their asset productive. People like to feel productive. The difference between 20% APR and 10% APR on a risk asset is minimal in terms of user behaviour. The difference between nothing 0% and 5% is huge. They will feel like their asset is unproductive if they cannot stake it. Some people will simply never be bothered with LPing, even in a favorable pool or when most difficulty is abstracted away.

It will also accommodate for the people that don’t want to incur any IL or don’t want any exposure to the pairing asset. USDC, ETH or WBTC.

Aside of chain, I think the inquiry is also about DEX. 1inch, Sushi etc.

I would favor Uniswap v3 at this point.


Henlo frens

Great to see DAO active on future proposals again. Thanks team for bringing critical discussion.

  • Would you like to see a single-sided MC staking pool next to the LP pool?
    yes single side with lower APY though, 1 year is enough giving almost 100% APY, that’s just insane for doing completely nothing with just risk of price decrease while LProviders takes the biggest risks + eat all “potential” dumps from early backers and investors.
  • What asset would you prefer as an LP pairing asset next to MC; ETH, WBTC, USDC or something else?
  • What weights should the LP pool have?
    10-15 SS 85-90 LP
  • What is the preferred platform for LP tokens? (currently uniswap v2 50/50 LP tokens)
    **If there are smart people who can manage Uniswap V3, I think it should be considered. If not UNI V2 is just fine :slight_smile: **
  • How long would you want the locking periods to be?
    from 0 to 12 months flexible, perhaps 24months at max but with exponential weight on voting power
  • Should the staking subsidy be fixed or partly variable?
  • What % of DAO revenue should go to staking rewards? (currently everything used to build treasury, re-invest and buy back and burn $MC)
    If this is going to be the case it would make sense to reward the most loyal and long term supporters. Perhaps with the weights considered either. Additional rewards can go from proposed by @SirDutchie as spagetti-exit. I totally agree with such flexible function. Lets say person wants his liquidity asap, penalty goes through formula of long was lock period committed and how many time remains. Starting from 10-20% at minimum imo.
  • Should the DAO, outside of locked MC, also distribute ETH, WTBC or USDC from revenue to stakers with longer locks?
    This is good idea. My concern is still VCs in this case with massive bags at cheap price. I think we should revise this later on based on the VCs activity perhaps.
  • How long should staking rewards be locked for?




ETH isn’t welcome here.

Most of our destruction of price is due to whoever decided that early on (on top of Binance distros).

Warnings were given ahead of time, none were listened to.

So no, you are not getting your ETH.

It’s time to undo that failure.


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Is there a ways to outperform ETH really? As far as Im aware there not a single token that outperformed ETH YTD. TradingView Chart

That chart is an argument for ETH.

Remember, you are forced to take exposure in a secondary token. You would prefer that asset to outperform, not underperform.

Exhibits against USD.



I don’t have input for all questions but below are thoughts on some:

That said, have some thoughts on below questions.

  • What asset would you prefer as an LP pairing asset next to MC; ETH, WBTC, USDC or something else?

I think the comments about a USDC/ETH LP pool are good and I would like to see one. However, I think we can easily have two pools (an ETH/MC pool and a USDC/MC pool). The manner in which they could operate is that the the awards attributed to the LP pool (in the current system the 80% of the 100% that goes to the LP stakers) would be rebalanced daily to the stakers pro rata share of the total LP.

As an example let’s say there is $10M worth of ETH/MC + $10M of USDC/MC = $20M of total LP staking. From the perspective of the staking site, it symply sees $20M staking that awards need to be distributed pro rata between according to the $ value that is staked. In this scenario, the ETH/MC and USDC/MC would each get 50% of the 80%. This would rebalance daily (or you could have it rebalance every minute even in theory). The point is regardless if you so ETH/MC or USDC/MC you are sre still getting your pro rate share of the total LP staking rewards based on your pro rata size of the total LP $'s staked.

This would allow individuals to chose for them selves if they want to take a position on the relative value of ETH or USDC and prevent the DAO from self-selecting out individuals that would have otherwise been interested in LP staking. If ETH rises dramatically, that share of the total pool will rise as well and increase the liquidity. Visa versa, if ETH drops dramatically in value, the USDC relative size of the LP pool will become larger and the total liquidity the DAO has will not be as impaired. From my perspective it seems like a win-win for the DAO and the staker to allow both types of LP to co-exist.

What is the preferred platform for LP tokens? (currently uniswap v2 50/50 LP tokens)

I think we should continue with what is already in place (uniswap v2)

Should the staking subsidy be fixed or partly variable?
I don’t feel I have proper experience to have a strong opinion here. I guess I would say if the rewards are all $MC come out of the tresury or community incentives etc. then fixed is ok.

However, over the longer period, I would assume it makes the most sense for staking subsidies to be variable accoring the the DAO’s performance. For eampple, many public companies (especially ones that have investments and therefor revenues are lumpy and inconsistent year-to-year will target dividends as being x% of net earnings. This keeps the business from not becoming over committed if they have a rough patch and everyone remains happy when the business is performing well.

Should the DAO, outside of locked MC, also distribute ETH, WTBC or USDC from revenue to stakers with longer locks?
I think it would likely detract from the DAO’s value to distribute ETH, WTBC, or USDC. If the DAO reports treasury vale of non-native tokens only, then you are are directly impeading the hard floor asset value of the DAO.

How long should staking rewards be locked for?
I wish I understood all the U.S. tax implications for these. I believe these technically become income at the time of the unlock. As such, if I believe $MC’s token value will appreciate, I would prefer an unlock earlier even if I have no intention in selling.

Something I think would be interesting is to do is make the unlock/vesting period run inverse to the staking period. For example, if I stake for 12 months, my vesting is only 6 months from time of claim vs. if I’m doig flexible staking then vesting is 12 months. I think this would create a vey interesting dynamic where it the long term stakers likely are already committed to holding $MC so the shorter vesting may not lead to sell-offs, makes the choice of which staking option is better skew to the long-term liquidity staking, and in tandum, if the $MC appreciates during the longer vesting period, might convert some of these less committed stakers to actually become long term holders of the token.


Hi all

Very similar views to a lot of the posts already made on this topic but thoughts as follows:

  • Would you like to see a single-sided MC staking pool next to the LP pool?
    Yes happy to keep a single sided MC staking pool but the weights should be similar to the current 20/80 split with the LP pair.

  • What asset would you prefer as an LP pairing asset next to MC; ETH, WBTC, USDC or something else?
    I do understand the original reasoning for chosing ETH over USDC but I think the last 6 months have shown that we end up trading as a higher Beta ETH, which clearly has not been a good thing with the market conditions since November. The reverse of this is that if we do go through another positive price movement with ETH then we should also perform well. However, I would prefer to see USDC as the LP pair, it will be interesting to see the performance of MC when we are not tied to ETH.

I appreciate that inflation is high at the moment and this will reduce the value of USDC but we can always move back to ETH again in the future. Also, I don’t think you can compare ETH as a store of value, it is quite clearly a high beta asset.

  • What weights should the LP pool have?
    As above, 80/20

  • What is the preferred platform for LP tokens? (currently uniswap v2 50/50 LP tokens)
    Current platform works well.

  • How long would you want the locking periods to be?
    12 months

  • What % of DAO revenue should go to staking rewards? (currently everything used to build treasury, re-invest and buy back and burn $MC)
    Does a percentage of the revenue need to be used for staking rewards? Not something that can be answered without further information being provided.

  • Should the DAO, outside of locked MC, also distribute ETH, WTBC or USDC from revenue to stakers with longer locks?
    I would prefer the DAO retain revenue and use it to continue to grow the treasury. Maybe in future this could be an option but I still think it is too early for the DAO to go down this route at the moment.

  • How long should staking rewards be locked for?
    12 months - like the current system

I think it is important to ensure that current LP stakers who are locked for 12 months are not disadvantaged if we move from ETH to USDC.

Thank you to the core contributors for raising this topic and I look forward to a few of the points going to a vote.

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I have some thoughts on the other points of discussion but specifically want to comment on the MC counterpair question.

I strongly prefer ETH and think choosing USDC or any another USD stablecoin as the LP counterpair would be a significant mistake.

There’s 2 key, somewhat interrelated points here:

  1. By LPing you’re forced to take a position in the MC counterpair and I think it’s pretty hard to argue for a position in USD vs ETH longterm, especially while simultaneously being bullish MC. @tommyq has already addressed the first part of this and I agree with his comments.

  2. IL comes from directional movement of 1 asset against the other in an LP pair. Broadly speaking it is advantageous to provide liquidiity for correlated assets and MC will almost certainly be more correlated with ETH than a stablecoin. Although pairing with ETH will lead to higher volatility, even assuming we can’t know taking a position in ETH has an overall higher EV than USDC we can still say having it as a counter-pair is advantageous due to higher correlation.

To elaborate a bit further:

As I mentioned @tommyq has already made a strong case against USD broadly. USD is not actually “stable”, it is a moderately -EV position that has become more -EV with the recent increase in inflation.

I suppose you could prefer USDC if you’re bearish on ETH long term but this seems a pretty bizarre stance given the nature of MC. We’re a crypto-gaming DAO. While not impossible, it’s a somewhat strange position to be bullish on crypto gaming and bearish on one of the biggest underlying platforms for those games.

I think the objections of “risk” are short-term thinking driven by a mostly bearish last few months. If Merit Circle had launched 6 months earlier and instead we were having this conversation last November I doubt we’d be hearing too many objections to an ETH counter pair. While I understand the sentiment and know these last 5 months or so have been very trying at times, this is all still very results oriented thinking and shouldn’t guide our long-term decision making.

We can illustrate the second point, that it’s advantageous to LP with correlated assets with some simple math.

MC is currently trading near $2. For whatever staking period we’re considering let’s say there’s a 50% chance MC increases or decreases by $1. In this case the EV of holding MC by itself is 0, however the EV of LPing varies depending on MC’s correlation with it’s counterpair.

First let’s consider LPing with a stablecoin counterpair. In this case when MC goes up to $3 the value of a $1000 LP position increases to $1224.74 and when MC goes to $1 the value of the position declines to $707.11. The overall EV of this position is -$34.07. This is due to the relatively high rate of impermanent loss due to 0 correlation between MC and USDC.

Now let’s consider an ETH counterpair position and assume a 0.5 correlation between MC and ETH with a starting ETH price of $3000. In this case when MC increases to $3 ETH increases to $3750 and the value of the LP position increases to $1369.31. When MC decreases to $1 we assume ETH declines to $2250 and the value of the LP position declines to $612.37. The overall EV of this position is -$9.16, significantly better than the -$34.07 EV of the stablecoin LP position strictly due to the the higher correlation between the paired assets and thus less IL.


I’d just like to reiterate that for me not having a MC-USDC LP is full on a break point, and that includes exclusion of another MC-ETH LP.

the prizes deriving from staking must absolutely be released immediately, otherwise someone could think of a scam, and we do not attract new investors, and the price always falls, wake up and take action immediately, put to the vote immediately.

Spot on, very good points. For long-term holding ETH and MC is clearly a superior investment.

It´s beyond ironic to have some many people in crypto favoring a centralized stablecoin pegged to fiat money.



A great man once said I must stop thinking like dev, so I read this thread twice: once reading as dev, once reading as cat. I think there were some interesting points raised, but both cat and dev me agree that we need an USDC LP. I think impermanent loss is a meme with staking rewards implemented. Profit made from MC rewards will far outperform any impermanent loss made or fees earned.

Long term, Tommy might be right about the inflation risk of USDC, but right now we’re in uncertain times and being tied to a highly volatile assets seems very risky. I think the ETH-MC LP decision was made with the expectation that ETH would keep on climbing against the USD, but that didn’t happen, so it might be justified to call that a mistake.

The opinions seem very divided about this topic and waiting till November is silly. Even if Tommy is right long-term, we can still profit from USD non-volatility short-term. I say we put it to a vote to add a USDC-MC LP Pool to the staking contract and adjust the weights of the current pools. Currently, the single-sided staking is 20% and ETH-LP is at 80%. Perhaps for the rest of the staking period we can adjust the weight to:

  • Single-side: 15%
  • USDC-LP: 40%
  • ETH-LP: 45%

If the ETH-LP lockoooors feel rugged because of the decrease in weight, perhaps it might be an idea to provide additional MC to the rewards pool? I am too clueless about current available MC balance for this, so it might be a low IQ suggestion.

Anywho, counter my suggestions and let’s make a proposal for a real solution. USDC LP can not be ignored.


Electric Dick Dev